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Being held responsible for our actions strongly determines our moral judge-
ments and decisions. This study examined whether responsibility also
influences our affective reaction to others’ emotions. We conducted two
experiments in order to assess the effect of responsibility and of a sense of
agency (the conscious feeling of controlling an action) on the empathic
response to pain. In both experiments, participants were presented with
video clips showing an actor’s facial expression of pain of varying intensity.
The empathic response was assessed with behavioural (pain intensity
estimation from facial expressions and unpleasantness for the observer ratings)
and electrophysiological measures (facial electromyography). Experiment 1
showed enhanced empathic response (increased unpleasantness for the
observer and facial electromyography responses) as participants’ degree of
responsibility for the actor’s pain increased. This effect was mainly accounted
for by the decisional component of responsibility (comparedwith the execution
component). In addition, experiment 2 found that participants’ unpleasantness
rating also increasedwhen they had a sense of agency over the pain, while con-
trolling for decision and execution processes. The findings suggest that
increased empathy induced by responsibility and a sense of agency may play
a role in regulating our moral conduct.1. Introduction
Being held responsible for our own actions and for their effects on others deter-
mines our moral sense and conduct. Our moral judgements regarding an
individual’s action depend not only on its effects on others (e.g. pleasant or
unpleasant consequences), but also on the individual’s degree of responsibility.
An individual is held responsible when he or she executes an action that has
direct consequences for others, and even more so when that action is perceived
as intentional (i.e. if a decision about the action was also made). It has been
shown that intentional actions that have unpleasant effects on others are
judged as being more wrong than accidental actions even though the conse-
quences are identical [1–3]. Likewise, our moral decisions are also affected
when our personal responsibility is involved. Moral reasoning studies have
shown that we make different decisions regarding harmful conduct when we
imagine being personally involved compared with imagining what a third
party would do [4,5].
Watching harmful conduct that causes pain in an individual not only has
some implications for our moral judgements and decisions, but can also elicit
an affective reaction from the observer. Yet it is not known whether our
responsibility for another’s pain also affects our affective reaction to that
pain. Observing another’s pain will likely elicit an empathic response in the
observer [6]. Empathy has been defined as an affective vicarious response, iso-
morphic to the emotion that provoked it [7,8]. In other words, empathy is the
ability to feel what the other feels [8]. Regarding empathy for pain, this
would refer to the unpleasant feeling that one experiences when observing a
person in pain. Another component of the empathic response, the cognitive
component of empathy [9], refers to the ability to understand or evaluate
how much pain a person is in [8].
There is evidence that individuals’ responsibility for
another’s pain modulates pain perception and the brain’s
responses associated with it [10–12]. Akitsuki & Decety
[10] have shown that the intensity of a pain caused intention-
ally by another agent is rated higher than the intensity of a
pain caused accidentally, and that brain activity increased
in regions involved in representing social interaction and
emotion regulation. Koban et al. [12] showed that uninten-
tional personal involvement in another’s pain (i.e. when
participants erroneously caused pain) induced an enhanced
haemodynamic response in the insular cortex, which is part
of the affective component of the pain matrix [13]. However,
no research to date has established an explicit relationship
between the empathic response (i.e. the vicarious unpleasant
feeling experienced by the observer) and the personal
responsibility (intentional involvement) for that pain.
In this study, we analysed whether personal responsibility
for another’s pain affects the empathic response to that pain.
Responsibility for an action strongly depends on the intentional
nature of that action. Intentional actions involve decisional
processes about what action to select, and when to act [14],
as well as processes of action control to carry out the action
selected. Furthermore, the actions that we are responsible for
are often accompanied by a sense of agency, the conscious
experience of controlling one’s own actions and their conse-
quences [15,16]. Therefore, we determined which components
of responsibility (the decision about the action, the execution
of the action and/or the sense of agency over the action)
would affect empathy. We developed two original experiments
in which the empathic response to another’s pain was
measured in conditions that differed in the participants’
degree of responsibility for pain. The first experiment assessed
whether decision and/or execution processes affect the
empathic response to pain. In the second experiment, we exam-
ined whether the sense of agency affects that response while
controlling for decision and execution processes.
These two experiments were designed so that participants
believed that they were participating in a clinical trial testing
a new painful treatment in which another volunteer was actu-
ally receiving the treatment. They were shown some video clips
showing the volunteer’s face expressing different intensities of
pain (among four pain intensities). In the first experiment,
the participants’ degree of responsibility for the pain was
modulated by manipulating their intentional actions at the
decision or the execution level. Either participants were passive
observers or they were required to apply the painful treatment
(‘execute’ condition), or they had to make a decision about
what action to select (select one intensity among four treatment
intensities) and execute the action (‘decide and execute’ con-
dition). In the second experiment, the participants’ sense of
agency was manipulated in addition, by adapting the sense
of agency paradigm in which the origin of an action (self or
externally generated) was made ambiguous [17]. This allowed
us to assess whether the conscious feeling of controlling an
action also affected the empathic response. In both exper-
iments, participants’ vicarious affective experience of pain
was assessed with behavioural and electrophysiological
measurements. Behavioural measures included pain intensity
ratings (i.e. how intense is the pain observed?) and unpleasant-
ness ratings (i.e. how unpleasant is it for the observer?) in order
to assess the cognitive and affective components of empathy,
respectively. Electrophysiological measures included facial
electromyography (EMG) and heart rate variability (HRV).These metrics are known to correlate with negative affect and
empathic response. Facial expression in response to an other’s
pain expression appears to be a reliable indicator of empathic
response. Lamm et al. [18] showed that frowning increased
when presented with videos of patients’ faces expressing
pain. In addition, the facial muscle, orbicularis oculi, involved
in the typical cheek raising and tightening of the orbits of pain-
ful expression, was specifically contracted when participants
had to put themselves in the patients’ position. HRV can be
considered as ‘an index of regulated emotional responding’
[19]. The neurovisceral integration model [20] proposes that
high frequencies (HFs) of the HRV signal, an index of cardiac
vagal tone, are associated with emotion reappraisal and
coping with unpleasant stimulation. As real-life social inter-
actions are demanding in terms of emotion regulation, and
especially social situations such as harmful conduct in which
a person must overcome his/her moral beliefs to accomplish
a task, we posited that HF-HRV would be modulated by the
degree of responsibility in such social interactions.
Overall, because accidentally causing pain to an individ-
ual enhances our empathic response [12], we hypothesized
that increasing participants’ degree of responsibility for
another’s pain would increase the empathic response. This
effect may be explained by one or several components of
responsibility, the decision about the action, the execution
of the action and/or the sense of agency over the action.2. Common procedure in the two experiments
Assessing the impact of responsibility on the empathic
response for pain required that participants believe that
they could inflict pain on another person. For this purpose,
we used a plausible scenario describing a situation in
which the inflicting physical suffering on others was morally
acceptable. Participants were informed that the research
experiment on pain perception for which they had volun-
teered was taking advantage of another clinical trial testing
a new treatment for pain that was taking place at the same
time in an adjacent room. They were told that the clinical
trial involved one volunteer (in reality a professional actress)
who had received the treatment for pain in order to assess her
ability to feel the pain stimuli. They were told that the volun-
teer would be filmed and that they would observe her face
while the painful stimuli were applied. Participants were
informed that sometimes the clinician running the clinical
study would repeatedly apply an electric current (with one
intensity varying among four intensities) to the volunteer’s
hand, through electrodes placed on the back of her hand,
whereas at other times, they themselves would trigger the
electrical current. To familiarize participants with the exper-
imental procedure and make the scenario more realistic to
them, participants were shown other video clips with two
professional actors playing the roles of the clinician and the
volunteer and they were required to perform practice trials
(see the electronic supplementary material: familiarizing
participants with the experiment).
The stimuli consisted of video clips of a professional actress
making facial expressions of pain with different intensities
(low, moderate, intense, very intense). Each 2 s video clip
started with a neutral facial expression for 500 ms, which
then evolved to a painful expression for 1500 ms (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material for detailed stimuli preparation
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Figure 1. Experimental design. In experiment 1, each session consisted of one passive condition (‘observe’) and two responsibility conditions (‘execute’ and ‘decide and
execute’). In the conditions ‘observe’ and ‘execute’, the pain intensity was indicated in green on the instruction screen. In the condition ‘decide’, all the intensities
appeared in green to let the participants choose between the four possible intensities. In experiment 2, participants had to choose the pain intensity and their
sense of agency was made ambiguous by showing them a facial expression of pain corresponding either to their chosen intensity or to a different intensity. Participants
then made an agency judgement by indicating whether they had triggered the pain. For both experiments and for each condition, participants’ unpleasantness rating
‘Is it unpleasant?’ (for themselves) and pain rating ‘Is it painful?’ (for the other person) were assessed in separate sessions using a visual analogue scale.and validation for experiments 1 and 2). Physiological data
(EMG and electrocardiogram, ECG) were continuously
recorded from the beginning of the experiment.
Forty-four healthy volunteers were recruited for the two
experiments; four of them were later excluded from the study
because of inappropriate compliance with the experimental
procedures. In the end, 21 volunteers took part in experiment
1 (24.8+5.5 years old, 12 women) and 19 volunteers in exper-
iment 2 (23.7+4.2 years old, nine women). None of the
participants had a history of psychiatric or neurological disease.
Written informed consent was obtained from all the partici-
pants. The study conformed to the Code of Ethics of the
World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki), and the
protocol experiment was approved by the local Committee
for the Protection of Human Subjects (no. 1-10-29).3. Experiment 1
(a) Material and methods
Experiment 1 consisted of three conditions that differed in the
participants’ degree of responsibility for the actress’s pain
(figure 1). In the ‘observe’ condition, participants passively
observed the actress’s facial pain expression; they had neither
to select an intensity of current nor to trigger the electric cur-
rent. In the ‘execute’ condition, participants had to press a
button to trigger the electric shock and they were told the
intensity of the shock in advance. In the ‘decide and
execute’ condition, participants had to select one intensity
current among four possible intensities (low, moderate,
intense, very intense) and trigger the current. The degree of
the participants’ responsibility for the actress’s pain increased
from the ‘observe’ condition to the ‘execute’ condition and
from the ‘execute’ condition to the ‘decide and execute’ con-
dition. The order of conditions was pseudo-randomizedacross participants, so that each condition was presented an
equal number of times in the first, second and third position.
All conditions were grouped into two sessions. In one ses-
sion, participants evaluated their feeling of unpleasantness,
induced by observing the actress’s pain (unpleasantness
rating). In another session, they had to evaluate the intensity
of the observed pain (pain intensity rating). These ratings
were given on a visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from
not painful/unpleasant to extremely painful/unpleasant.
Each condition was repeated twice within each session. The
order of these sessions was counterbalanced across partici-
pants, and each session lasted at least 4 min (including the
instruction screens) and consisted of 20 trials of 10 s each
(five trials per intensity level). A short break was offered
every two sessions. At the end of the experiment, a 10min
rest session was additionally recorded for baseline ECG.(b) Analyses and results
(i) Participants’ involvement in the task
Participants were questioned about their belief in the realism of
the experiment using a five-point scale (1, did not believe; 2,
seriously doubted; 3, could not say; 4, a slight doubt; and 5,
no doubt). The debriefing analyses revealed that participants
were indeed well involved in the task, because 90% of them
strongly believed in the realism of the experimental context
(scores 4 and 5) or had a doubt (scores 2 and 3), but still believed
it could be real. All the participants, including thosewho didnot
believe, asserted that they behaved as if they had no doubt. In
addition, participants more frequently chose lower intensities
when they had to decide on the pain level, although they were
asked to select all pain intensities an equal number of times
(see debriefing and table S1 in the electronic supplementary
material, table S1, for more details about the debriefing).
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Figure 2. Behavioural results of experiment 1. Unpleasantness rating (red)
refers to participants’ evaluation of their feeling of unpleasantness induced
by observing the actress’s pain. Pain intensity rating (blue) refers to the
evaluation of the intensity of the observed pain (i.e. the actress’s pain). Par-
ticipants’ unpleasantness ratings increased when they decided and executed
the action that induced the pain, compared with the ‘observe’ condition.
However, pain ratings were not modified by increased responsibility. Reported
values are mean+ s.e.m. **0.01  p. 0.001. (Online version in colour.)(ii) Pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings
Participants rated the intensity of the observed pain and their
feeling of unpleasantness by moving a cursor with a mouse
on the VAS. The locations of the cursor on the scale were
then converted to a 0–100 scale. Pain intensity and un-
pleasantness ratings were compared across conditions of
degree of responsibility (‘observe’, ‘execute’, ‘decide and
execute’) and intensity levels (low, moderate, intense, very
intense) using a 2 (response type)  3 (degree of
responsibility)  4 (intensity level) multivariate analysis of var-
iance (MANOVA). The data revealed a significant main effect of
participants’ responsibility (F2,17 ¼ 3.88, p ¼ 0.04, partial h2 ¼
0.16). The significant interaction between responsibility and
the dependent variables further showed that increased responsi-
bility enhanced unpleasantness for the observer, but not pain
intensity ratings (F2,17 ¼ 3.87, p¼ 0.041, partial h2 ¼ 0.18). Post
hoc Tukey’s tests confirmed that unpleasantness was rated
higher when participants had to both select an intensity level
and trigger the current (‘decide and execute’ condition) than
when they had to passively observe the actress’s pain (‘observe’
condition; p ¼ 0.002, figure 2). The difference between the two
other conditions was not significant (‘execute’ versus ‘observe’:
p ¼ 0.40; ‘execute’ versus ‘decide and execute’: p ¼ 0.20).
As expected, both pain intensity and unpleasantness were
ratedhigher for higher intensity levels, as revealed by the signifi-
cant main effect of intensity level (F3,54¼ 324.59, p, 0.001,
partialh2 ¼ 0.95). The intensity level affected the two ratingsdif-
ferently, as shown by the significant interaction with the
dependent variable (interaction effect: F2,17 ¼ 3.87, p ¼ 0.041,
partial h2 ¼ 0.18). The pain intensity rating increased more
than the unpleasantness rating when the highest intensity
levels (3 and 4) were selected (p  0.001; figure 2). The intensity
level did not, however, interact with the degree of responsibility.(iii) Physiological measurements
An effect of responsibility was also found on the two physio-
logical responses associated with observing facial painexpressions. Facial EMG was recorded over the regions of
the orbicularis oculi and the corrugator supercilii, the muscles
involved in the facial expression of pain [21]. The EMG
response was scored as the ratio of the signal during the 2 s
video clips with the signal during the 1 s baseline period pre-
ceding the video (see the electronic supplementary material for
more details about technical details of physiological record-
ing). To correct for normality, data were log transformed
(log(x þ 10)) with a constant of 10 to avoid having negative
data in the log. A 3  2  4 (responsibility  pain intensity/
unpleasantness ratings  intensity) MANOVA test, and post
hoc Tukey’s tests were conducted on the transformed data.
The EMG response of the two facial muscles involved in the
expression of pain increased with participants’ responsibility
for the volunteer’s pain (for both muscles: F2,17  6.49, p 
0.008, partial h2  0.22). Cheek raising (orbicularis oculi) was
significantly more intense for both ‘execute’, and ‘decide and
execute’ conditions compared with the ‘observe’ condition
(p  0.01), whereas frowning (corrugator supercilii) increased
in the ‘execute’ condition compared with the ‘observe’
condition (p ¼ 0.01; figure 3a).
Standard deviation (s.d.) of the interbeat intervals (IBIs)
and spectral analysis of HRV were computed throughout
each experimental session, thus independently of pain inten-
sity. We then calculated the ratio of low-frequency bands
and high-frequency bands (LF/HF; see the electronic sup-
plementary material for more details about technical details
of physiological recording). Because the response type (pain
intensity/unpleasantness ratings) had no effect on the ratio
low frequency/high frequency (LF/HF), the final MANOVA
model comprised only the three responsibility conditions for
analysing the ratio, along with a rest condition for the s.d.
analysis. We observed a significant decrease in the s.d. of
the IBI for all conditions compared with rest (F3,15¼ 3.83,
p ¼ 0.032, partial h2 ¼ 0.24, Tukey’s comparison of each con-
dition versus rest: p  0.021), confirming that participants
were cognitively and/or emotionally involved in the task
(figure 3b). Analysing the LF/HF ratio, which is considered
an index of ‘sympathovagal balance’ [19], we found that this
ratio decreased with participants’ responsibility (F2,17¼ 6.48,
p ¼ 0.008, partial h2 ¼ 0.19), with a significant difference
between the ‘observe’ condition and the ‘decide and execute’
condition (p ¼ 0.019). This difference can be explained by a
concomitant increase in HF and a decrease in LF in the
‘decide and execute’ condition compared with the ‘observe’
condition (F2,17¼ 4.71, p ¼ 0.023, partial h2 ¼ 0.18, Tukey
comparison p ¼ 0.027), demonstrating a higher engagement
of cardiac vagal control when participants had to both select
the pain intensity level and trigger the current.4. Experiment 2
(a) Material and methods
In the second experiment, we further explored the effect of
responsibility on pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings by
assessing whether this effect may be partly explained by partici-
pants’ sense of agency over that pain (i.e. their conscious feeling
of causing the pain). The paradigm of experiment 1 was modi-
fied in order to modulate the sense of agency while keeping
the decision processes (selecting one intensity level) and the
action control processes (triggering the current) identical. The
sense of agency was made ambiguous by adapting a paradigm
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Figure 3. Physiological results of experiment 1. The results have been calculated for both pain and unpleasantness ratings. (a) The orbicularis oculi, the muscle that
raises the cheek during facial expression of pain, was more contracted when participants only executed or decided and executed the action than when they passively
observed the actor’s facial expression of pain. The corrugator supercilii ( frowning) was significantly more contracted compared with the ‘observe’ condition only
when participants executed the action. (b) The ratio low frequency/high frequency (LF/HF) of the heart rate variability was significantly affected by the main factor
responsibility, with a significant difference between the ‘observe’ and the ‘decide and execute’ condition. Reported values are mean+ s.e.m. **0.01  p . 0.001,
***p  0.001.in which the outcomes of an action are distorted, resulting in a
diminished sense of agency over the outcome [17]. As for exper-
iment 1, participants were asked to rate the pain intensity in half
of the sessions and their feeling of unpleasantness in the other
half. Three responsibility conditions were examined. The
‘observe’ condition was identical to experiment 1 and allowed
participants to implicitly associate the intensity level with the
corresponding facial expression of pain. The ‘discrepancy’ con-
dition was similar to the ‘decide and execute’ condition of
experiment 1. However, in the ‘discrepancy’ condition, they
observed the facial expression corresponding to the intensity
level selected in about 50% of the trials (no-discrepancy trials),
and they observed a facial expression that did not correspond
to the intensity selected in the other half of the trials (discrepancy
trials, see the electronic supplementarymaterial for details about
discrepancy in the intensity levels). The third condition, ‘sense of
agency’, was identical to ‘discrepancy’ except that before the ses-
sion, participants were told that the current could be applied
randomly either by themselves or by the clinician. Participants
did not know prior to the video onset whether they or the clini-
cian had actually triggered the current. They became aware of it
when seeing the video. Therefore, the main difference with the
‘discrepancy’ condition was that participants could attribute
the actress’s pain to the clinician. As a consequence, there were
trials in which participants did not have a sense of agency over
the actress’s pain even though they made a decision and
executed the action. Participants’ sense of agency was measured
by requiring them to make a sense of agency judgement about
who caused the actress’s pain, themselves (‘self’-trials) or the
clinician (‘other’-trials; figure 1).
The three conditions were always run in the same order.
First, the ‘observe’ condition allowed participants to learn the
association between intensity level and the corresponding
facial expression of pain. The ‘discrepancy’ condition was
then run, followed by the ‘sense of agency’ condition. The
‘sense of agency’ condition was always run after the ‘dis-
crepancy’ condition, to avoid participants attributing the
discrepancy trials to the clinician in the ‘discrepancy’ con-
dition. The ‘discrepancy’ condition was used to distinguish
the effect of discrepancy on empathy from the effect of the
sense of agency.(b) Analyses and results
(i) Pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings
We first assessed whether the effect of responsibility found in
experiment 1 was replicated in this second experiment. To do
so, participants’ ratings in the ‘observe’ condition were com-
pared with the ratings obtained in the no-discrepancy trials of
the ‘discrepancy’ condition as these trials were equivalent to
the ‘decide and execute’ conditions of experiment 1. We ran
a 2  2  4 repeated MANOVA test with responsibility
ratings  intensity. Replicating the results of experiment 1,
we found a significant interaction between ratings and
responsibility (F1,18 ¼ 8.26, p ¼ 0.010, partial h2 ¼ 0.31). As
in experiment 1, unpleasantness rating increased when parti-
cipants were responsible for the actress’s pain ( p ¼ 0.034)
compared with when they passively observed the pain,
whereas pain intensity ratings were not modulated by
participants’ responsibility ( p ¼ 0.72).
Manipulating the degree of discrepancy modulated par-
ticipants’ sense of agency (see the electronic supplementary
material for details about the sense of agency judgements).
We therefore distinguished the trials in which participants
felt that they had triggered the shock and therefore had a
sense of agency over the actress’s pain (‘self’-trials) from
those in which they felt that the clinician had triggered the
shock and therefore had no sense of agency (‘other’-trials).
We then examined the effect of the sense of agency on pain
and unpleasantness ratings. We first checked whether the
degree of discrepancy between the selected pain intensity and
the pain intensity expressed by the actress’s face affectedpartici-
pants’ pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings. In fact, this
needed to be discarded from these ratings in order to assess
the effect of the sense of agency independently of the degree
of discrepancy. A repeated MANOVA test with ratings and
degree of discrepancy as factors was run for each pain intensity
level. Thedegree of discrepancyaffected bothpain intensity and
unpleasantness ratings, whatever the intensity of the pain
observed (for both ratings: F2/3,17/16. 7.72, p, 0.004, partial
h2. 0.32). Participants’ ratings decreased when the observed
pain intensity was higher than the intensity chosen, and
increased when the observed intensity pain was lower. To
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Figure 4. Behavioural results of experiment 2. Unpleasantness rating (red) refers
to participants’ evaluation of their own unpleasant feeling induced by observing
the actress’s pain. Pain intensity rating (blue) refers to the estimation of the inten-
sity of pain experienced by the actress. Participants’ unpleasantness ratings were
higher when they attributed the trigger of the pain to themselves (‘self’), whereas
pain ratings were not modified by participants’ sense of agency. Reported values
are mean+ s.e.m. *0.05  p. 0.01. (Online version in colour.)accurately assess the effect of the sense of agency on pain inten-
sity and unpleasantness ratings, participants’ behavioural
measurements in the sense of agency condition were therefore
corrected with a measurement of the discrepancy effect. We
defined the discrepancy effect as the difference in the ratings
(separately for pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings)
between the no-discrepancy trials and the discrepancy trials.
This effect was calculated for each degree of discrepancy and
for each subject. These differences were then subtracted from
the ratings obtained in the ‘sense of agency’ condition. This
resulted in pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings that
were not contaminated by the degree of discrepancy. The cor-
rected measures were then analysed using a (2 2  4; sense
of agency  pain/unpleasantness  intensity) MANOVA. We
found that participants’ ratings increased in the ‘self’-trials
compared with the ‘other’-trials (F1,18¼ 6.12, p ¼ 0.02, partial
h2 ¼ 0.25). Crucially, we found that participants’ sense of
agency affected pain intensity ratings and unpleasantness
ratings differently, as revealed by the interaction between
the sense of agency condition and the dependent variable
(F1,18¼ 5.15, p ¼ 0.04, partial h2 ¼ 0.22). Post hoc analyses
further revealed that only unpleasantness ratings increased in
the ‘self’-trials compared with the ‘other’-trials. (Tukey’s post
hoc: pain ‘self’ versus ‘other’ p ¼ 0.98, unpleasantness ‘self’
versus ‘other’ p ¼ 0.046, figure 4).(ii) Physiological measurement
EMGwas recorded as described in experiment 1. As for behav-
ioural data, physiological data were previously corrected for
discrepancy effect. However, HRV could not be computed on
a trial basis as short as 10 s [22].
The same analytical procedure as for behavioural mea-
surements was used for physiological data. A main effect of
responsibility (‘observe’ versus ‘decide and execute’) was
found on facial EMGs. Observing a painful expression
induced more intense facial EMGs when participants had
previously selected the intensity level and triggered the
shock (corrugator: F1,18 ¼ 21.55, p , 0.001, partial h2 ¼ 0.55;
orbicularis: F1,18 ¼ 13.96, p ¼ 0.001, partial h2 ¼ 0.44).Regarding the comparison between ‘self’ and ‘other’ trials,
EMGs were analysed using a 2  2  4 (sense of agency 
pain/unpleasantness  intensity) MANOVA and post hoc
Tukey’s tests. We did not observe a significant sense of
agency effect (corrugator: p ¼ 0.11; orbicularis: p ¼ 0.57).5. Discussion
Observing the pain reaction of another person is likely to elicit
an empathic response towards that person. In this study, we
found that being held responsible for that pain by being
actively involved in it causes enhanced empathic response.
Increasing participants’ degree of responsibility over others’
pain resulted in increased unpleasantness, which was further
corroborated by an increase in facial EMG responses in
experiment 1.
The patterns of both electrophysiological and behavioural
responses convinced us that participants’ affective reaction to
the observed pain was correctly characterized as an empathic
response, as defined by de Vignemont & Singer [7], and thus
could not be confused with other vicarious pain experiences.
Indeed, both these patterns show that the affective state eli-
cited by observing painful facial expressions, and modulated
by the degree of responsibility, was a negative affect, iso-
morphic to the feeling that had elicited it (the actress’s facial
expression of pain). First, the degree of responsibility increased
the affective response (i.e. the rating of unpleasantness), but
not that of pain intensity. Second, the contraction of two
facial muscles involved in pain expression (corrugator superci-
lii and the pars orbitalis of the orbicularis oculi) also increased
with responsibility. The EMG of these two muscles was not
modulated by the intensity of the observed facial pain,
suggesting that these facial responses did not reflect a mere
motor mimicry, in which the contraction of facial muscles
are directly and automatically induced by the observation of
facial movements [23–25]. Rather, these facial EMGs reflect
the expression of negative affect felt by participants, as also
observed for the observation of unpleasant scenes in which
no facial cues were presented (see [26] for review). Although
frowning, controlled by the corrugator supercilii, is a generic
facial movement for negative affect, cheek raising and eye nar-
rowing, controlled by the orbicularis occuli, are more specific
to painful expression [18,21].
Other authors do not limit their definition of empathy to
the affective aspect and argue instead for two components of
empathy: the affective and the cognitive [27,28]. In this
study, the affective component referred to the evaluation of
unpleasantness for the observer, whereas the cognitive com-
ponent referred to the evaluation of the intensity of another’s
pain. This cognitive component was modulated neither by
the degree of responsibility (experiment 1) nor by the sense
of agency (experiment 2). This means that the increased
unpleasantness (or emotional empathy) when the participants’
degree of responsibility for the actress’s pain increased cannot
be explained by an overestimation of the observed pain. This is
in line with Shamay-Tsoory’s arguments [9], which view the
cognitive and emotional components of empathy as partially
separate and involving independent processes, as well as
Morrison et al.’s [29] proposal to distinguish between pain
empathy and pain recognition.
Responsibility also affected participants’ emotional regu-
lation as revealed by variations in the HRV across conditions.
In experiment 1, changes in HRV were observed in the ‘decide
and execute’ condition, with a decrease in the LF/HF ratio
reflecting a higher involvement of vagal control over HRV.
High vagal activity has been linked to successfully coping
with stressful or unpleasant situations [19,30–32] and results
in successful emotional and cognitive regulation [33]. These
results show that there was more emotional regulation when
participants had to decide on the intensity level and to execute
the action.
Responsibility for an action strongly depends on whether
the action is intentional. We found that the decision com-
ponent of intentional action had the most pronounced effect
on participants’ empathy, on both their behavioural and phys-
iological responses. The feeling of unpleasantness significantly
increased when participants had to select an action (i.e. select
the intensity level) and execute the action (i.e. trigger the
shock) compared with when they passively observed another’s
facial pain expression. Likewise, facial EMG over the orbicu-
laris occuli significantly increased when participants had to
take a decision and execute the action. One significant differ-
ence was found, however, in that the orbicularis occuli and
the corrugator supercilii activity also increased when partici-
pants solely executed the action previously selected by the
clinician. Therefore, these findings show that the effect of par-
ticipants’ responsibility on their empathic response can be
accounted for by decision processes and more specifically by
the decision about which action to select. Action control pro-
cesses might also be involved, because facial EMG increased
in the ‘execute’ condition compared with the ‘observe’
condition. However, this effect was not observed on partici-
pants’ unpleasantness ratings suggesting that action control
might be involved to a lower extent in the modulation of
empathy. This difference might be explained by the fact that
the judgement of unpleasantness does not solely rely on par-
ticipants’ negative affect, which is reflected by facial EMG.
Therefore, participants’ degree of responsibility in the ‘execute’
condition might be sufficient to affect their negative affect but
not the explicit judgement about their affect.
In the second experiment, we found that participants’
sense of agency over the pain also affected their empathic
response. Participants’ feeling of unpleasantness increased
when they became consciously aware that their action (and
not the clinician’s) caused the observed pain. The effect of par-
ticipants’ sense of agency on their empathic response cannot
be explained in terms of anticipation nor in terms of difference
in the decision and the control of action, as these processes
were carefully controlled: (i) participants always had to take
a decision and execute the action and (ii) the judgements of
agency could not be anticipated as participants did not
know at the beginning of the trial whether they or the clinician
would trigger the current, and only became aware of it when
watching the video. Furthermore, the sense of agency’s effect
on empathy occurred irrespective of the magnitude of the
error, as unpleasantness and pain ratings were carefully cor-
rected for the discrepancy effect. Recently, Koban et al. [12]
manipulated participants’ responsibility for another’s pain by
creating situations in which their actions accidentally caused
another’s pain. This error agency modulated the participants’
perception of the pain and yielded enhanced activity in the
anterior insula. Our present findings differ from those of
Koban et al. [12] because they showed that the conscious feel-
ing of controlling an action per se affected the empathic
response independently of any error effects.This reveals an important and yet unexplored aspect of the
sense of agency: its role in social cognition. This role could well
not be limited to empathyand encompass other aspects of social
cognition. Indeed, the consciousness of our actions and their
effects on others could affect the way we perceive others’ reac-
tions, in terms of their emotions, their actions and even their
intentions; this, in turn, might have some implications in the
regulation of our social behaviours. There is, indeed, previous
evidence that the effects of our actions on others generate
emotional and affective reactions that might help regulate
social behaviour. When our actions have positive consequences
(acts of kindness or sympathy), they are accompanied by a posi-
tive feeling that helps reinforce these actions [34]. The present
findings show that when an action has negative or unpleasant
consequences for others, there is a stronger negative emotional
reaction. This amplified response may have an impact on the
regulation of that behaviour. Indeed, we found that respon-
sibility led to more emotional regulation, suggesting that
participants were reluctant to carry out the action. These find-
ings confirm previous research in social psychology showing
that, when people witness the pain they have inflicted on
others, this can generate vicarious negative affect that may
help to restrain harmful conduct [35]. We therefore argue that
enhanced empathy associated with responsibility may play a
role in regulating our social behaviour by preventing us from
harmful actions, thereby reinforcing our moral conduct. Note,
however, that this regulation effect cannot be considered as sys-
tematic, but is highly dependent on the social context (e.g. a
physician will not interrupt a medical painful act because
he/she is responsible for it). In other contexts, the enhanced
empathic response might lead to prosocial behaviour (e.g. a
parent will comfort her/his child after having applied a painful
medical treatment to her/him). Indeed, it is known that
empathic response can trigger prosocial behaviour [31,36–39],
which can even be species-specific [40]. Therefore, depending
on the social context, responsibility and sense of agency can
have different impacts on social cognition, and these effects
might, in turn, lead to distinct social behaviours. Future research
will need to further characterize these effects and the resulting
social behaviours.6. Conclusion
This study has shown that when we have a responsibility for
others’ suffering, our empathic response to that suffering is
increased. We have also demonstrated that both decision pro-
cesses and the conscious feeling of controlling our action, the
sense of agency, explain this effect. This enhanced empathy
elicited by intentional voluntary action may play a role in
the regulation of moral conduct. These findings therefore
open up avenues for future research on the ways in which
responsibility and sense of agency effects on other perception
may influence moral behaviour.
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